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11 Introduction
In modern economies, with a high level of welfare services and extensive income re-
placement schemes, the tax burden is typically high. And with strong pay-as-you-go
(PAYG) elements, in the sense that individuals on average are net recipients as old
and net contributors when active in the labour market, changes in the age composition
of the population can have dramatic consequences for public ￿nances. Demographic
shocks may thus translate into substantial changes in either taxes or welfare services.
Since such changes often would be politically unacceptable, the main challenge is how
the same welfare opportunities can be maintained for di⁄erent generations without
causing substantial intergenerational redistribution (Andersen et al., 2008).
To avoid escalating generational con￿ icts and threatening ￿scal sustainability in
the wake of demographic shocks, pension reform - in a broad sense - seems almost
inevitable. For example, when labour supply shrinks as a result of a lower fertility rate,
an obvious response would be to raise the statutory retirement age. However, since
decisions about labour supply ultimately rest with private households, the change in
the e⁄ective retirement age might well be much smaller than the change in the statutory
retirement age. In fact, retirement is spread over a whole range of ages, re￿ ecting that
the e⁄ective retirement age is not under direct government control. There may thus
be substantial backlashes to reform, and these should be accounted for in order to get
a realistic assessment of what might be achieved through a reform process (Boersch-
Supan and Ludvig, 2010).
In this paper we study the scope for controlling the supply of labour through re-
tirement reform. Our framework for addressing this important question is a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations. We model the link
between the extensive and the intensive margins of labour supply, with the statutory
retirement age serving as a proxy for the extensive margin. The novelty of this ap-
proach is that it allows for deriving the implications on the intensive margin of labour
supply to a change in the statutory retirement age. By assuming that the statutory
retirement age is under government control, it is therefore possible to derive the change
in the statutory retirement age which, under alternative demographic and economic
contingencies, is needed to neutralize changes in the e⁄ective labour supply.
Our main result is that an increase in the statutory retirement age has the potential
to neutralize the fertility-induced decline in the labour force, provided that the statutory
retirement age increases more than proportionally to the fall in fertility. The reason
is that workers increase their demand for leisure, both when fertility falls and when
the statutory retirement age increases. As a result, labour supply will fall not only
due to low fertility but also as a side e⁄ect of the increase in the statutory retirement
age. Consequently, policy makers should account for such reform backlashes when
formulating the optimal policy to alleviate the impact of low fertility.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we present the model and the
analytical solution method. Section 3 characterizes the market equilibrium and shows
how key macroeconomic variables respond to a change in fertility. Section 4 considers
the policy option of changing the statutory retirement age in order to neutralize the
decline in the labour force. Finally, section 5 concludes and outlines some ideas for
future research.
22 The model
In this section we present our analytical framework. This is a stochastic overlapping
generations (OLG) model in line with Bohn (2001), here augmented by endogenous
labour supply. The model consists of four di⁄erent building blocks: demographics,
households, production, and social security. We ￿rst describe each block, and then
outline the solution method.
2.1 Demographics
Individuals are assumed to be identical across cohorts, and to live for three periods: as
children, adults and elderly, respectively. We denote the children born in period t as
Nc
t , where Nc
t = btNw
t and bt > 0 is the birth rate. Adults are denoted by Nw
t and they
are assumed to work for the full length of period t. During period t+1 they are retired.
The growth rate of the labour force, nw
t (￿ Nw
t =Nw
t￿1 ￿ 1), is given by the product of
the fertility rate in the previous period, bt￿1, and a factor denoting the length of the
working period, ￿t (i.e., nw
t ￿ bt￿1￿t). A fall in the fertility rate in the previous period
thus implies a shrinking labour force in the present period. Figure 1 illustrates how
adult lifetime is divided between work and retirement periods, respectively.
Figure 1. Adult lifetime: work and retirement
In a standard OLG framework, the working period, t, and the retirement period,
t+1, are assumed to be equally long. In reality, however, the length of the two periods
might di⁄er considerably. For example, if the statutory retirement age increases, the
share of life spent working goes up, provided that the total lifetime is unchanged. In
order to allow for such a di⁄erence in the length of the two generational periods, we
follow the standard practice of considering the overall time periods, t and t + 1, as
aggregate ￿supra-periods￿divided into fractional ￿sub-periods￿ . A similar technique
has been applied by Auerbach and Hassett (2007), Chakraborty (2004) and Bohn (2001,
2002, 2006). The supra-periods are assumed to adjust to have the same lengths as the
generational periods of work and retirement; the sub-periods of the total length of
life merely may not be distributed equally across supra-periods, but consists of an
unchanged total number of sub-periods.1
1A supra-period could be de￿ned to include any given number of smaller sub-periods without loss
of consistency with the overall OLG model structure (Figure 1); all sub-periods remain of exactly the
same length. Alternatively, the whole life could be considered as one single supra-period consisting of
a number of sub-periods. The categorization into supra-periods is merely necessary in order to match
the di⁄erential behavior of generations in their working and retirement periods with equivalent lengths
of period t and t + 1￿ irrespective of how many sub-periods each supra-period consists of. A change
in the length of a generational period will, therefore, be accompanied by an equivalent change in the
supra-period by simply changing the number of sub-periods a given supra-period consists of. This
3The separation point between supra-period t and supra-period t + 1 is interpreted
as an exogenous (statutory) retirement age where an agent changes status from having
completed ￿ working sub-periods in supra-period t to entering a retirement supra-
period t+1 consisting of ￿ sub-periods. Therefore, an increase in ￿ is equivalent to an
increase in the statutory retirement age, where workers would have to remain in the
labour force for a longer time-period. Hence, the e⁄ective growth rate of the labour
force, and the extensive margin of labour supply, increases. For a given length of total
life, ￿; the total sum of sub-periods remains unchanged, and there will merely be fewer
sub-periods in the retirement period t + 1, as can easily be seen
￿t = ￿t ￿ ￿t￿1 (1)
The total length of life is assumed to comprise an expected and an unexpected
component: ￿t = ￿e
t￿1￿u
t , where f￿g 2 (0;2￿￿), while ￿ 2 (0;1). Thus, the total length
of life cannot be longer than the sum of sub-periods in two supra-periods. We assume
that bt, ￿t, and the components of ￿t, are stochastic and identically and independently
distributed.
Workers are assumed to elastically supply labour, Lt, up to one unit, u 2 (0;1),
where Lt = utNw
t , and ut = 1 ￿ lt is the intensity of labour supply in the working
period. First period leisure therefore equals lt = 1 ￿ ut. Note that changes in e⁄ective
labour supply can therefore be decomposed into three e⁄ects: ￿rst, the e⁄ect from
the exogenous extensive margin, ￿; second, the e⁄ect from the endogenous intensive
margin, u; and, third, the e⁄ect from the exogenous growth in the number of workers,
b. It is common in the literature to endogenise the intensity of labour supply, but
to combine this with changes in labour supply at the extensive margin has, to our
knowledge, not previously been attempted.
2.2 Households
We adopt a log-utility function, displaying homothetic preferences over consumption
and leisure, bearing in mind the well-known limitations of the log-speci￿cation.





+ ￿2Et [￿t+1 lnc2t+1] (2)
We denote c1t and c2t+1 as ￿rst and second period consumption, respectively. The
discount rate on c2t+1 is ￿2 > ￿1, and ￿ > 0 is the relative weight on leisure in
utility. Decisions about consumption for children are assumed to be made by parents,
so children make no economic decisions and the intertemporal optimization by parents
collapses to a two-period setting. An explicit formulation of the optimisation of parents￿
utility over their own consumption and that of their children is not important, since the
optimisation problem would merely relate ￿rst period consumption of the household to
the weight that parents assign to consumption of their children. However, the childhood
period is conceptually important in this model, since it is a change in fertility in period
t ￿ 1 that a⁄ects the size of the labour force in period t.2
implies that two generations could be on the labor market simultaneously, which extends the extensive
margin of labor supply as we structure the model.
2This relation can be shown to enter into lifetime utility as a weight on ￿rst period consumption,
￿1(bt) > 0, that depends positively on the number of children, see Jensen and Jorgensen (2008). We
4Second period consumption is scaled by the length of the retirement period.3 The
higher is ￿; the longer period of time retirees can enjoy consumption. While the same
argument also applies to the length of the ￿rst period, ￿, for consumption and leisure,
we stress that if ￿ increases then some of the "sub-periods" in retirement, which are all
composed by full leisure, will be substituted by sub-periods that consist of both labour
and leisure in the working period. This has a negative impact on lifetime leisure. A
novelty of our approach is to scale leisure by ￿t to account for this e⁄ect. As a result,
individuals can now account for the disutility of a fall in lifetime leisure, in case the
retirement age should increase, by increasing leisure in their working period. In this
case, the e⁄ective labour supply would initially rise by the full amount of the increase in
the retirement age. But this e⁄ect will be counteracted if the disutility of less lifetime
leisure induces workers to supply labour less intensively.4
The restrictions on c1t and c2t+1 are presented in (3) and (4),




St + ￿t+1 (1 ￿ lt+1)￿t+1wt+1 (4)
where ￿t is the pension contribution rate, St is the level of savings, and ￿t is the pension
replacement rate. In terms of income in the working period, wt￿t, the wage rate in each
sub-period (say, in each year) is denoted by wt, while ￿t denotes how many sub-periods
people have to work (say, the length of the working period in terms of years)5. The
gross return to the savings of retirees, Rt = (1 + rt), is scaled by ￿ to account for the
fact that savings must be spread across a given length of the retirement period.








Note the roles of ￿ and ￿ as implicit prices on consumption and leisure: consump-
tion and leisure must be spread across the lengths of working and retirement periods,
respectively. Utility is therefore increasing in ￿ and ￿, but so are the implicit prices on
consumption and leisure.
assume, however, that a 1% increase in fertility would increase ￿1(bt) by 1%, because parents need to
provide more consumption to more children in the household; i.e. ￿1(bt) is normalised at 1.
3Both Auerbach and Hassett (2007), Bohn (2001), and Chakraborty (2004) have incorporated the
length of the retirement period (sometimes alternatively referred to as survival probabilities) into the
utility function, but neither have incorporated the length of the working period. This is a novelty of
our approach. Furthermore, in Bohn (2001), ￿ does not depend negatively to the retirement age, and
in Chakraborty (2004), ￿ is endogenous to health expenditure and is incorporated so it encompasses
both the discount rate and at the same time the length of total life. In our approach, however, ￿ is
endogenous, and it depends on changes in the statutory retirement age or changes in the total length
of adult life, i.e. ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿, and that could not be analysed by neither Bohn (2001) nor Chakraborty
(2004).
4By modelling the utility of leisure in this way we implicitly add the value of second period leisure
into the utility function without having to maximise explicitly with respect to lt+1.
5If the retirement age increases, and the capital-labour ratio and the wage rate fall, then the income
of workers may either increase or decrease depending on whether the drop in the wage rate across all
sub-periods accounts for smaller fall in income than the increase in income induced by the additional
sub-periods of work.
5By maximising lifetime utility (2) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint




















Note that households prioritise less consumption in the ￿rst period if fertility de-
creases. This will lower ￿1(bt) in (6) and (7), such that c1t falls relative to c2t+1 and lt.
If ￿ or ￿ changes, the optimality conditions will remain una⁄ected.6
2.3 Social security





where the left (right) hand side illustrates the pension bene￿ts (contributions). Neither
￿ nor ￿ need to be ￿xed, so the PAYG system can in principle display either de￿ned
bene￿ts (DB) or de￿ned contributions (DC) schemes. To re￿ ect the empirical fact that
the DB system is the most widespread PAYG arrangement (Gruber and Wise, 1999),








2.4 Technology and resources
Output, Yt, is assumed to be produced by ￿rms with a Cobb-Douglas technology in




Productivity is denoted by At and is assumed to be stochastic and growing at a rate,
at; such that At = (1 + at)At￿1, where at is assumed identically and independently
distributed. The return to capital and the wage rate are standard and de￿ned by
rt (kt) = f0 (kt) and Wt (kt) = f (kt) ￿ ktf0 (kt), and kt￿1 ￿ Kt=(At￿1Lt￿1) de￿nes the
capital-labour ratio over growth rates.8 By assuming that ￿rms are identical, capital
6The increase in utility of a longer working or retirement period is o⁄set by a corresponding increase
in the implicit prices of consumption and leisure in the intertemporal budget constraint.
7If the longevity of current retirees increases, the retirement period would residually increase, given
that the retirement age remains unchanged, and this would call for a higher contribution rate. Similarly,
an increase in the retirement age, given an unchanged length of life, would yield a lower contribution
rate. Last, but not least, if fertility falls so will the growth in the number of workers and contributions
need to rise to balance the PAYG budget.
8Since a smaller labour force leads to an increase in the capital-labour ratio, changes in factor returns
are likely to occur, see Kotliko⁄ et al. (2001), Murphy and Welch (1992) and Welch (1979).
6will be accumulated through the savings of workers, i.e. Kt+1 = Nw
t St. Furthermore,
we assume that over one generational period (app. 30 years) capital fully depreciates.
The constraint on the economy￿ s aggregate resources is,
Yt ￿ Kt+1 = ￿tNw
t c1t + ￿tNw
t￿1c2t (10)
which features the lengths of the working and retirement periods, respective, in con-
nection with the sub-period rates of consumption. This completes the outline of the
model. Next, we present our solution method.
2.5 Solving the model
We solve the model analytically for the responses of economic variables to changes in
fertility and the statutory retirement age. The solution method is designed to provide
analytical elasticities of economic variables with respect to stochastic shocks, and it
involves transforming the stochastic OLG model into a version that is log-linearised
around the steady state of the model. Our analytical approach facilitates the isolation
of the necessary response of the statutory retirement age that will o⁄set any negative
responses of labour supply9.
A version of the method of undetermined coe¢ cients, which relies on Uhlig (1999)
and extended by Jorgensen (2008) to accommodate an OLG model structure rather
than the original real-business-cycle structure, is adopted to obtain the analytical solu-
tion for the recursive equilibrium law of motion. The variables of the linearised model
are stated in e¢ ciency units and in terms of percentage deviations from the steady
state (marked with "hats")10. A linear law of motion for the recursive equilibrium of
the economy is conjectured,
b xt = Pb xt￿1 + Qb zt
b vt = Rb xt￿1 + Sb zt
which is characterised by linear relationships between endogenous state variables in the
vector b xt and exogenous state variables (the shocks) in the vector b zt. The non-state
endogenous (jump) variables are denoted by b vt. The coe¢ cients in the matrices P, Q,
R, and S are interpreted as elasticities.
As an example of how a given endogenous variable is determined by changes in e.g.
lagged fertility, b bt￿1, or the statutory retirement age, b ￿t, we illustrate the law of motion
for leisure,
b lt = ￿lkb kt￿1 + ￿lc2b c2t￿1 + ￿lb1b bt￿1 + ￿l￿b ￿t (11)
where, e.g., ￿l￿ denotes the elasticity (￿) of leisure (l) with respect to the retirement
age (￿)11.
9The advantage of an analytical, closed form, solution is that changes in any economic variable
can be traced back to the underlying parameters and fundamental properties of the model. Thereby,
valuable intuition on the impact of falling fertility on economic variables can be gained.
10See Appendix A for more details on the solution technique.
11All endogenous variables fb kt;b c1t; b c2t; b lt; b yt; b Rt; b wt; b ￿tg can be expressed in this fashion. The






t g, but (11) only
illustrates the shocks to lagged fertility and the statutory retirement age. The vector of endogenous
state variables is fb kt;b c2tg so these remain in equation (11) no matter which shocks are examined.
7A key advantage of this analytical approach is that the impact on leisure of a
change in the retirement age is stated in terms of an elasticity, ￿l￿, the size of which,
by construction, assumes a 1% shock to the statutory retirement age, b ￿t. Therefore, we
simply ask: "how will leisure change if there was suddenly an increase in the statutory
retirement age of 1%?". Using this terminology, we basically make comparative statics
with a model that is otherwise designed to be stochastic12. This procedure is, by now,
standard in the real-business-cycle literature (see, e.g., Uhlig, 1999). Our contribution,
in this context, is to tailor the method in Uhlig (1999) to ￿t a stochastic OLG model,
which is complicated by changes in the retirement age that implies future changes in
length of the retirement period.
The elasticities can be interpreted (both analytically and numerically) and employed
in connection with the design of policy rules for the retirement age when fertility has
fallen and brought down the size of the labour force. We calibrate the analytical
expressions of the model with values, in Table 1, that we trust are realistic to suit a large
economic region such as Europe or the USA, and subsequently derive the numerical
elasticities of the model. Importantly, we make robustness analyses with the weight on
leisure in the utility function in section 4, since the model predictions depend crucially
on the calibration of this parameter.
Table 1. Parameter calibration
Parameter Value Interpretation of steady state parameters
￿ 1=3 The capital share in output
￿ 0:35 The pension replacement rate
a 0:40 The steady state growth rate of productivity
￿ 1 The rate of capital depreciation
￿ 1 The length of the working period
￿ 0:8 The length of total life
b 0:1 The rate of growth in the number of children
￿ 1 The weight on leisure in the utility function
￿￿1(b) 1 The elasticity on the weight of ￿rst period
consumption in utility with respect to the birth rate
￿2 0:292 The consumption discount rate13
Note: The payroll tax rate will then be ￿ = ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)=(1 + nw) = 0:30. The
calibration of the discount rate equals 0.960 per year or 0.292 over a 30 year period,
and generates a savings rate of 20%.
3 Economic e⁄ects of low fertility
In this section we analyse some economic e⁄ects of a shock to the birth rate in the
previous period, b bt￿1. The assessment focuses on the impact on leisure (b lt), workers￿
consumption (b c1t) and retirees￿consumption (b c2t). Speci￿cally, the economy is repre-
sented by a linear law of motion in terms of elasticities for endogenous variables with
12Note that the size of a stochastic shock to, e.g., fertility could be any value from a given pre-speci￿ed
distribution of innovations.
13The calibration of the discount rate equals 0.960 per year or 0.292 over a 30 year period, and
generates a savings rate of 20%.
8respect to a fertility shock. These elasticities are reported in Table 2. The relevance
of decomposing the net e⁄ect on each variable into various sub-e⁄ects is to obtain a
better understanding of the magnitudes involved in the numerical simulations.
Table 2. A shock to the fertility rate
Variable Value Elasticity
￿c1b1 = ￿0:02 = [￿c2k ￿ ￿Rk]￿kb1
￿lb1 = ￿0:11 = ￿c1b1 + ￿23￿￿b1 ￿ ￿22￿wb1
￿c2b1 = 0:54 = [￿15￿lb1 ￿ ￿3￿c1b1 ￿ ￿5￿kb1 ￿ ￿2]=￿4
￿kb1 = ￿0:02 =
￿12￿wb1￿￿21￿lb1￿￿8￿￿b1
￿9￿wk￿￿7￿c2k+￿12￿Rk￿￿20￿lk
The key issue is how a fertility decline a⁄ect the work-leisure choices. A number of
counteracting forces are operating, and the net e⁄ect remains theoretically ambiguous.
However, our numerical simulations imply that leisure will increase by 0.11% after a
1% fertility fall.14 The increase in leisure corresponds to a reduction in the intensity
of labour supply, which will magnify the initial fertility-induced e⁄ect on the shrinking
e⁄ective labour supply and the increasing capital-labour ratio.
Changes in wages and pension contributions basically determine the e⁄ects on work-
ers￿consumption after the shock to fertility (see Jensen and Jorgensen, 2008). On the
other hand, since labour supply is a choice-variable, consumption and leisure are in-
terrelated and indirectly a⁄ect the capital-labour ratio: More leisure leads to an even
higher capital-labour ratio, higher wages, and lower capital returns (see ￿gures 2a and
2b). Therefore, by examining the intertemporal budget constraint in (5) we can analyse
the substitution, income, and wealth e⁄ects on leisure.15
The substitution e⁄ect on leisure comes from a shrinking labour force that alters
factor payments: Wages increase and the return to capital falls. The price (opportunity
cost) of leisure thus increases so the substitution e⁄ect on the demand for leisure is
negative. A given level of income can now buy less, resulting in negative income e⁄ects
on all goods, including leisure. The wealth e⁄ect is positive for all goods, because
the increased wage rate appears in lifetime income.16 The dynamics of leisure and
retirees￿consumption are illustrated by the simulated trajectories in ￿gures 2c and 2d,
respectively.17
In an in￿ uencial paper, Weil (2006) ￿nds that a key mechanism through which
aggregate income and welfare are a⁄ected by population ageing is the distortion from
taxes to fund PAYG pension systems. This mechanism is also present here: the price on
leisure depends on ￿; i.e. the (￿ at) PAYG contribution rate. With labour supply being
14Elasticities are, by construction, derived for a positive 1% shock to fertility. Therefore, the elas-
ticities of economic variables with respect to a negative fertility shock must be interpreted with the
opposite sign of those displayed in Table 2.
15In the case where labour supply is exogenous (see, e.g., Jensen and Jorgensen, 2008), the only e⁄ect
on the capital-labour ratio originates from the lower fertility rate.
16See the right-hand side of the intertemporal budget constraint in equation (5).
17The dynamics of ￿rst-period consumption is identical to the simulated trajectory for leisure, though
larger numerically.
9endogenous, this distorting tax rate implies that the positive wealth e⁄ect will more
than o⁄set the (negative) sum of substitution and income e⁄ects (i.e. ￿lb1 = 0:11)18.
Figure 2. Economic e⁄ects of a fall in fertility
a. Wage rate b. Return to capital









Response to a one percent decline in fertility, lagged














































Response to a one percent decline in fertility, lagged





































c. Workers￿leisure d. Retirees￿consumption









-4 Response to a one percent decline in fertility, lagged















































Response to a one percent decline in fertility, lagged





































There are additional e⁄ects to consider in order to obtain a complete analysis of the
impacts of low fertility. Due to, ￿rst, a changing capital-labour ratio and, second, the
presence of distortionary taxation we have to consider "factor price e⁄ects" and "￿scal
e⁄ects", respectively: a negative fertility shock implies that each worker (in the smaller
labour force) must pay more taxes (because the bene￿ts to retirees are assumed ￿xed in
a DB system). Thus the ￿scal e⁄ect is negative. In addition, workers will receive higher
wages due to the higher capital-labour ratio so the factor price e⁄ect is positive. This
net e⁄ect is caused by a direct e⁄ect and an indirect e⁄ect: The population growth rate
falls which directly reduces the size of the labour force. The indirect e⁄ect is due to
the endogenous response of leisure (￿lb1 > 0) which has a reinforcing negative e⁄ect on
labour supply. The implication for e⁄ective labour supply is, therefore, that the initial
negative e⁄ect from lower fertility is ampli￿ed by lower intensity of labour supply due
to the demand for more leisure as a consumption-equivalent good.
18The distorting e⁄ects increase with the size of the pension system, so the larger ￿ is the larger is,
the larger is ￿lb1. If taxation was lump sum and not distortionary these three e⁄ects will o⁄set each
other so the net e⁄ect on leisure is zero, given that intertemporal elasticity of substitution equal to one,
as in our case.
10The net e⁄ect on consumption is consequently ambiguous, but our simulations show
that consumption increases for a negative fertility shock: ￿c1b1 = 0:02 and ￿c2b1 =
￿0:54, such that workers gain in terms of consumption and leisure and retirees lose in
terms of consumption. Thus, there will be an uneven intergenerational distribution of
the economic e⁄ects. While such welfare implications will not be pursued further in
this paper, it is an interesting topic for future research.
4 Policy reform
The statutory retirement age can be used as a policy instrument to increase e⁄ective
labour supply by retaining workers in the labour force for a longer period of time ￿
and denying them PAYG pension bene￿ts until this later date. Such changes will have
economic implications that should be well understood by policy makers before designing
a policy rule for the retirement age. The purpose of this section is to present a positive
analysis on how changes in the retirement age a⁄ect key economic variables.
While the statutory retirement age is exogenous to the consumer, this is not the
case for the e⁄ective retirement age since the intensity of labour supply is assumed
endogenous to the household. If the statutory retirement age increases, no matter why,
households may thus decide to supply less labour. If this reduction in labour supply
takes place towards the end of households￿working life (rather than being spread across
all sub-periods of the working period), the reduction re￿ ects the fact that people may
retire earlier based on their own savings and thus represent a fall in the e⁄ective
retirement age.
An exogenous increase in the statutory retirement age will tend to directly increase
labour supply and lower the length of the retirement period, which is in line with our
speci￿cation of the length of the retirement period is residually determined by the
length of the working period (￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿). As a result, workers need to save less for a
shorter retirement period.
Table 3. A shock to the statutory retirement age
Variable Value Elasticity
￿c1￿ = 1:06 = [￿c2k ￿ ￿Rk]￿k￿ + (￿c2￿1 ￿ ￿R￿1)
￿l￿ = 0:04 =
[￿c2k￿￿Rk]￿k￿+(￿c2￿1￿￿R￿1)+(￿23￿￿￿+￿22￿11)
1+￿22￿11
￿c2￿ = 0:42 = [￿9￿wk ￿ ￿7￿c2k + ￿12￿Rk ￿ ￿20￿lk]￿k￿
￿￿21￿l￿ + ￿12￿w￿ ￿ ￿8￿￿￿
￿k￿ = ￿0:31 =
￿15￿l￿￿￿3￿c1￿￿￿4￿c2￿￿￿2
￿5
The change in leisure is determined through the same channels as a fertility shock:
the substitution e⁄ect, the income e⁄ect, the wealth e⁄ect, and the ￿scal and factor
price e⁄ects, respectively. These dynamics are all intertwined through both exogenous
and endogenous changes in the capital-labour ratio and changes in pension contributions
and bene￿ts. The net e⁄ect on the capital-labour ratio is negative if the intensity of
labour supply does not endogenously fall more than the retirement age has increased.
11In that case the net e⁄ect on capital returns remains positive and the wage rate will fall.
This will indeed be the case since e⁄ective labour supply increases by 0:96% because
leisure increases by 0:04% for each 1%￿increase in the retirement age increases (see
table 3).19
Regarding the ￿scal e⁄ect: workers now face more subperiods during which they
work and has to contribute to the ￿xed PAYG bene￿ts of retirees. This implies less
need for savings to ￿nance a shorter retirement period, so workers save less and free
resources for leisure and ￿rst-period consumption. So, the ￿scal e⁄ect is positive.
In terms of substitution, income and wealth e⁄ects on leisure, we ￿nd that the
substitution e⁄ect is negative due to the net increase in the price on leisure. The
dynamics of factor payments therefore generate a positive wealth e⁄ect (lifetime income
increases dispropotionally to the fall in the wage rate but proportionally to the increase
in the statutory retirement age) and a negative income e⁄ect (an unchanged level of
income can buy less consumption and leisure since leisure has become more expensive).
The positive wealth e⁄ect o⁄sets the negative sum of substitution and income e⁄ects,
partly due to distortionary taxation, so the e⁄ect on leisure is positive.20
A particularly important mechanism in this model is that we account for the dis-
utility of work in terms of less lifetime leisure when the retirement age increases, i.e.
workers will be induced to supply labour less intensively when the sub-periods of full
leisure in retirement are reduced.
An increase in the retirement age does not yield an equal increase in e⁄ective labour
supply when fertility has declined. This complicates the analysis of an mitigating policy
rule for the statutory retirement age. That is precisely why it is crucial to emphasize
the dynamics of the intensive margin of labour supply relative to the extensive margin.
This is what we study next.
We have seen that three main forces are operating when fertility or the statutory
retirement age change: the factor price e⁄ect; the ￿scal e⁄ect; and the endogenous
intensity of labour supply (determined, in turn, by substitution, income and wealth ef-
fects). In this section, we make use of our general equilibrium framework to derive how
much the statutory retirement age should increase in order to neutralize the decline in
the labour force caused by low fertility in the past.21 It is important, though, which
role one assigns to the statutory retirement age, and we operate under the explicit
assumption that the retirement age is an exogenous variable that is under government
control. Note, that our analyses are independent of the social desirability of any inter-
19This is also con￿rmed by the elasticities of the wage rate and capital returns with respect to
the retirement age (￿w￿ = ￿(1 ￿ ￿l￿) = ￿0:32; ￿R￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿l￿) = 0:64) which represents a
negative (positive) factor price e⁄ects for workers (retirees). The direct e⁄ect on, e.g., capital returns is
(1 ￿ ￿) due to the fall in the capital-labour ratio, while the indirect e⁄ect originating from endogenous
labour supply is (1 ￿ ￿l￿).
20As a result of the dynamics above, workers receive a lower wage rate over a longer working period,
which renders the net impact on ￿rst-period consumption theoretically ambiguous. We ￿nd that
￿c1￿ = 1:06 is positive, however, and that it depends, especially, on the need for less savings to ￿nance
a shorter retirement period and a higher lifetime income due to more sub-periods of work. Retirees tend
to gain in terms of consumption. The net e⁄ect is ambiguous, but our simulations show an increase in
￿c2￿.
21Proposals for using the retirement age as a policy instrument are found in, e.g., de la Croix et al.
(2004) and Andersen, Jensen and Pedersen (2008). Also, Cutler (2001) recommends an extention of
Bohn (2001) to incorporate "the length of the period where people work".
12generational (welfare) distribution of the associated e⁄ects22.
The e⁄ective labour supply comprises three elements: ￿rst, the fertility rate, b bt￿1;
second, the extensive margin limited by the retirement age, b ￿t; and third, the intensity
with which workers work (the intensive margin, b ut = ￿b lt). The e⁄ective labour supply
is dt = (1 + nw
t )(1 ￿ lt), or in log-deviations from steady state:
b dt = b bt￿1 + b ￿t ￿b lt (12)
Assume ￿rst that the intensity of labour supply is exogenous and that we examine
a 1% decline in fertility. It is then clear from (12) that the necessary response of the
statutory retirement age, which would o⁄set the fertility decline, i.e. b dt = b ￿t+b bt￿1 ￿ 0,
would just be a proportional increase of b ￿t = 1%. However, if the intensity of labour
supply is in fact endogenous, so b lt 6= 0, then clearly the response of b ￿t would have to be
di⁄erent from 1%. In our case, the initial e⁄ect from the fertility decline on the e⁄ective
labour supply will be reinforced because leisure increases, so the statutory retirement
age would have to increase even more than 1%. To derive the o⁄setting response of b ￿t
we insert the linear law of motion for b lt to obtain:
b ￿t = [￿lb1b bt￿1 + ￿l￿b ￿t] ￿b bt￿1 (13)
From (13) isolate b ￿t, and insert the numerical elasticities, ￿lb1 and ￿l￿, and the negative
fertility shock, b bt￿1 = ￿1:





b bt￿1 = 1:15 (14)
Observe that if ￿lb1 < ￿l￿ the optimal response is b ￿t > 1. So, we conclude that the
statutory retirement age has to increase more than fertility fell in order to o⁄set the
negative impact on the e⁄ective labour force. The o⁄setting response of the statutory
retirement age, when b bt￿1 = ￿1% and the weight on leisure in utility is ￿ = 3, amounts
to b ￿t = 1:15%.
These dynamics are due to the choice of leisure by individuals, which will increase
both when fertility falls and when the statutory retirement age increases. Thus, the
negative fertility-impact on labour supply is ampli￿ed. Since the weight that house-
holds place on leisure is so crucial to the macroeconomic dynamics when the labour
force shrinks, this weight should be tested for alternative values. The literature sug-
gests various values for ￿ generally within the range ￿ 2 f1;9g (see, e.g., Blackburn
and Cipirani, 2002; Cardia, 1997; Chari et al., 2000; Jonsson, 2007). We have cali-
brated our model with ￿ = 3, as an example, and found the o⁄setting response of the
statutory retirement age to be larger than the fertility rate (b ￿t = 1:15). In terms of
robustness analysis, however, we simulate the value for b ￿t given alternative values for
￿ and illustrate the results in ￿gure 3.
22Jensen and Jorgensen (2008) evaluates the attractiveness of an uneven distribution of the economic
e⁄ects associated with low fertility in a model with exogenous labour supply, while Jorgensen (2008)
does so in a model with endogenous labour supply.
13Figure 3. Robustness analysis
For ￿ = 0, the analysis for the o⁄setting response of b ￿t corresponds to the exogenous
labour supply scenario. The 1% fall in fertility can therefore be exactly o⁄set by a 1%
increase in the statutory retirement age. For small values of ￿ there is a tendency
for the o⁄setting response of the statutory retirement age to be even less than the
fertility-induced fall in labour supply. This means that a contraction in the labour
force combined with an increase in the statutory retirement age increases the intensity
of labour supply (reduces leisure). The large (net) increase in the price on leisure,
(1 ￿ ￿)w￿, when fertility falls and the statutory retirement age increases, drives the
substitution and income e⁄ects to outweigh the wealth e⁄ect so the intensity of labour
supply increases. As the weight on leisure increases beyond app. 1.6 this trend is
reversed. Households now value leisure to such a high extent that substitution and
income e⁄ects no longer dominate the decision to "purchase" leisure. The higher the
preference for leisure the greater the tendency to substitute for leisure, and this trend
exerts downward pressure on the intensity of labour supply. As a result, the o⁄setting
response of the statutory retirement age becomes increasingly larger than the fall in
fertility (the grey area in ￿gure 3).
An important question now arises: what is the empirical trend in the preference for
leisure? If households over the past decades have had a tendency to substitute for more
leisure as real wages (and, thus, the price on leisure) have increased, then the o⁄setting
response of the statutory retirement age is likely to equal a value on the curve in the
grey area of Figure 3. In that case, policy makers should take the resulting dynamics
into account when designing policy rules for the retirement age in order to overcome
the problems for welfare arrangement when fertility, and thus, labour supply has fallen.
According to Pencavel (1986), the share of life that men spend at work for pay
has fallen signi￿cantly. In fact, workers are retiring from the labour force at younger
ages, the number of hours worked per day or per week has fallen, and the number of
holidays has increased - and holidays have become longer. Schmidt-Słrensen (1983)
￿nds for Denmark that the number of working hours per week fell by 25% over the
period 1911-83, and by 15% over the period 1955-83. Similarly, the number of working
hours per year fell by 34% over the period 1911-81.
While the fraction of lifetime spent at market work may also have fallen because
14more time has been allocated to human capital investment, by spending more years
within the educational system, the empirical evidence clearly suggests that the prefer-
ence for leisure has been increasing for decades. It is therefore likely that the dynamics
of the economy, when facing a shrinking labour force, will generate more demand for
leisure as real wages increase. This implies that the o⁄setting response of the labour
force will be in a more than 1 : 1 relationship to the contraction in the labour force.
A model which does not incorporate labour supply as a choice variable may fail to
capture some important macroeconomic dynamics. The ability to analyse the impacts
of shrinking labour forces for various values for the preference for leisure thus marks a
signi￿cant extension of the framework used by, e.g., Auerbach and Hassett (2007) and
Bohn (2001). Such an analysis would not be feasible without the explicit relationship
in the model between the extensive and intensive margins of labour supply.
5 Conclusion
This paper has developed an intertemporal setting in which retirement policy can be
used to mitigate the fertility-induced changes in the supply of labour. Our main ￿nding
is that the retirement age should increase more than proportionately to a fertility
decline in order to account for negative responses of the intensity of labour supply.
However, this result depends crucially on the preference for leisure by households.
In line with empirical evidence there has been a tendency for leisure to rise when
real wages increase. And real wages tend to increase when labour supply shrinks as
a result of a fertility decline. Therefore, the necessesary o⁄setting response of the
stautory retirement age is likely to be even higher than previously believed. Without an
analytical framework linking the endogenous intensive margin to the extensive margin
of labour supply, this analysis would not be feasible.
The ￿nding, that leisure may increase when the statutory retirement age increases,
could be interpreted as an endogenous drop in the voluntary early retirement age,
￿nanced by workers￿own savings. This is exactly the opposite of what is intended by the
policy rule of increasing the statutory retirement age. This counteracting mechanism
is part of the underlying reason why we derive a more-than-proportionate o⁄setting
increase in the statutory retirement age.
The analytical framework is subject to a number of limitations. The utility func-
tion has been modelled in accordance with our best beliefs of how to incorporate the
value of leisure and the length of periods. However, the robustness of our result could
be examined in greater detail for alternative speci￿cations of the utility function. In
addition, we assume that the economic impacts of changes in dependency ratios can
be analysed in a linearised model. Simulation excercises with CGE models should, in
the future, be performed to yield a more empirically accurate, and country-speci￿c,
foundation for designing a policy rule for the retirement age. Last but not least, hu-
man capital accumulation may have the implication that workers choose to invest in
education to a higher extent when fertility is low because they receive higher wages.
As a result, the supply of labour may incorporate a higher productivity. Thus, there
may be less need for the statutory retirement age to increase to completely o⁄set the
smaller labour force. These issues may modify our results, and are interesting subjects
for future research.
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17A The solution method
The way we apply the method of undetermined coe¢ cients relies on Uhlig (1999). The
method is adapted, though, to the stochastic OLG structure of our model in line with
Jorgensen (2008). This appendix provides a brief overview of the solution method,
but we refer to the aforementioned authors for more details. All endogenous variables
from the log-linearised model, b et 2 fb kt;b c2t; b c1t; b lt; b yt; b Rt; b wt; b ￿tg, are written as linear
functions of a vector of endogenous and exogenous state variables, respectively. The
vector of endogenous state variables is b xt 2 fb kt; b c2tg of size m ￿ 123, the vector of
endogenous non-state variables is b vt 2 fb c1t; b lt; b yt; b Rt; b wt; b ￿tg of size j ￿ 1, while the






t g of size
g ￿ 1. The log-linearised equations are in written matrix notation in the following
equilibrium relationships,
0 = Ab xt + Bb xt￿1 + Cb vt + Db zt (15)
0 = Et [Fb xt+1 + Gb xt + Hb xt￿1 + Jb vt+1 + Kb vt + Lb zt+1 + Mb zt] (16)
b zt+1 = Nb zt + "t+1; Et ["t+1] = 0 (17)
where C is of size h ￿ j, where h denotes the number of non-expectational equations.
In this particular OLG model h = j, due to the de￿nition of b xt = fb kt; b c2tg, because
with merely the capital stock as a state variable h < j, and the system cannot not be
solved24. The matrix F is of size (m + j ￿ h) ￿ j, and it is assumed that N has only
stable eigenvalues.
The recursive equilibrium is characterized by a conjectured linear law of motion
between endogenous variables in the vector b et, and state variables (endogenous and
exogenous, respectively) in the vectors b vt and b zt. The conjectured linear law of motion
is written as,
b xt = Pb xt￿1 + Qb zt (18)
b vt = Rb xt￿1 + Sb zt (19)
where the coe¢ cients in the matrices P, Q, R, and S are interpreted as elasticities.
These linear relationships between endogenous variables and state variables could al-
ternatively be written out for each variable in b et., as e.g for leisure, b lt,
b lt = ￿lkb kt￿1 + ￿lc2b c2t￿1 + ￿l￿1b ￿t￿1 + ￿l￿b ￿t + ￿lab at
+￿lb1b bt￿1 + ￿lbb bt + ￿l￿e1b ￿
e
t￿1 + ￿l￿eb ￿
e
t + ￿l￿ub ￿
u
t
where e.g. ￿la denotes the elasticity (￿) of leisure (l) with respect to productivity (a).
The stability of the system is determined by the stability of the matrix P, given the
assumptions on the matrix N.
23In order to solve the model it is necessary to have at least as many state variables as there are
expectational equations in the model (h ￿ j).
24Note that if h > j the equations in this section become slightly more complicated, see Uhlig (1999),
but a solution is still feasible.
18The stable solution for this system boils down to solving a matrix-quadratic equation
in line with Uhlig (1999). The matrix-quadratic equation can be solved as a generalized
eigenvalue-eigenvector problem, where the generalized eigenvalue, ￿, and eigenvector,
q, of matrix ￿ with respect to ￿ are de￿ned to satisfy:
￿￿q = ￿q
0 = (￿ ￿ ￿￿)q
For this particular stochastic OLG model ￿ is invertible so the generalized eigenvalue
problem can be reduced to a standard eigenvalue problem of solving instead the ex-
pression ￿￿1￿ for eigenvalues-eigenvectors, as in (20). Then, ￿￿1￿ is diagonalized in




q = 0 (20)
P = ￿￿￿1￿￿
￿1 (21)
The matrix ￿￿1￿ =diag (￿;:::;￿m) then contains the set of eigenvalues from which a
saddle path stable eigenvalue can be identi￿ed, and the matrix ￿ = [q1;:::;qm] contains
the characteristic vectors. Ultimately, the matrix P, governing the dynamics of the
OLG model, is derived, and the system can be "unfolded" to provide the elasticities in
the matrices Q; R; and S. For more detail on the solution technique for RBC models
we refer to Uhlig (1999).
19